LESS IS MORE: HOW A WEAK OPPOSITION ENABLED STRONGER SUPPORT FOR THE REMOVAL OF MUGABE
Former President Robert Mugabe and Former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirayi |
This
article analyzes the removal of Robert Mugabe in the context of the strength of
the opposition, suggesting a correlation between a severely weakened opposition
and the removal of the nonagenarian dictator. It builds on previous
writings which assert that Robert Mugabe’s incumbency aided the opposition’s
messaging and recruitment. This article argues the converse; that a strong
opposition was central to Robert Mugabe’s claim for perpetual legitimacy as the
vanguard of the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism. Without a vibrant
personification of the abstracts he purported to defend his party and country against, the stage was set for creation of the critical consensus necessary
for his ouster.
In
this analysis, strength of the opposition is measured on three bases: its
representation in arms of the state (political representation), its internal cohesion
(operation as a singular coherent unit) and its external reach (human and
geographic scope and sphere of influence). Since the ultimate form of political
power stems from incumbency, strength of the opposition is based on its
relative distance from and involvement in incumbency. A strong opposition has
so much political representation, internal cohesion and external reach that it
has to be included in governmental decision making. A weak opposition is
divided, fragmented, has little political representation and can thus be ignored
by incumbents. The term ‘opposition’ will be used interchangeably with its
biggest formation, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The term ‘MDC’ is
used in reference to both the pre-2005 party and post-2005 formation led by
Morgan Tsvangirayi.
The
removal of Robert Mugabe from the presidency occurred when the MDC was arguably
at its weakest since its formation in 1999. The MDC has enjoyed two periods of
relative strength (2000 – 2004; 2008-2012) and two periods of relative weakness
(2005-2007; 2013 –2017). From 2000 -2004, the MDC had high cohesion as the main
opposition party. It used its extensive reach to defeat ZANU PF in a constitutional
referendum in 2000 and to win almost
half the parliamentary seats on the ballot in the same year. This resulted
in relatively strong political representation, sufficient to stop ZANU PF’s habit
of routinely amending the Constitution. The next period of relative strength was
after the success of the 2008 Harmonized Elections. The MDC won a narrow
majority in parliament, enabling it to select the Speaker of Parliament.
Through the Global Political Agreement (GPA), they secured a share of executive
authority and thus had a voice in all significant governmental decision making.
The
period of 2005-2007 was the first period of relative weakness for the opposition, beginning in
2005 when the MDC won 16
seats fewer than in 2000. ZANU PF restored the two-thirds majority it
needed to continue amending the Constitution, and quickly obliged by enacting
the 17th
Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment included a re-introduction of
the upper house of parliament; the Senate. Ironically, it would be the decision
over whether to participate in the senate elections which was the ostensible
reason for the first
major split in the MDC in 2005, leading to significant loss of reach and cohesion.
The MDC still retained a modicum of strength through its decision not to expel
its former members from parliament. Thus, they engaged in negotiations with
ZANU PF for free and fair elections and agreed on various reforms including the
18th Amendment to the Constitution and a draft constitutional text
(the Kariba draft).
This
is a far cry from the period of 2013 to 2017, during which the opposition has
been at its weakest. The MDC is
represented in parliament, but lacks sufficient numbers to stop any
constitutional amendments as shown by their futile opposition to the First
Amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013). It suffered yet another split in 2014,
losing further cohesion and reach. To make matters worse, the magnanimity of 2005
was cast aside and erstwhile colleagues were expelled from
parliament. The decision to boycott the resultant by-elections handed what
little initiative they retained back to ZANU PF. Without the clout of any
significant political representation and having lost further cohesion and
reach, the MDC resigned itself to being a political by-stander. It is not
engaged in any political negotiations with the incumbents in spite of incessant calls for dialogue. By its own admission; the MDC’s overtures to President
Mnangagwa prior to the formation of his new government received
no takers. It is in this context that opposition alliance
building has done little to increase its strength. Lack of cohesion has led
to the creation of at least three alliance platforms, each made up of political
formations which, outside of the MDC, lack political representation and have
very limited reach.
MDC Leader Morgan Tsvangirayi announcing the decision to expel former colleagues from parliament |
When
the opposition has been relatively weak, ZANU PF has been forced to confront
its internal challenges; with the raw aggression and opprobrium normally
reserved for the opposition delivered to its own party members. On the other hand,
a stronger opposition has tended to galvanize ZANU PF into a more internally cohesive
but outwardly aggressive unit. For instance, the loss by the MDC in the 2005
General Elections enabled ZANU PF members to retreat into entrenched zones of
factionalism, culminating in the bhora
musango strategy of ZANU PF
members campaigning and voting against Mugabe in 2008. Whilst this was made
worse by the 2004 Tsholotsho Declaration and its failure to elevate now
President Mnagangwa to the presidium, it is still emblematic of how a weak
opposition resulted in a less cohesive ZANU PF.
The
strong showing by the opposition in 2008 had the reverse effect, bolstering
internal unity within ZANU PF. Rallying around an anti-sanctions and bhora
mugedhi rhetoric, ZANU PF
campaigned for their troubled leader and went as far as to dismiss allegations of
factionalism as false. This would change dramatically after their mammoth
victory in 2013. Factionalism was not only publicly acknowledged, but used as the
basis to purge party members; first those aligned to then Vice President J.T.R.
Mujuru and later those aligned to then Vice President E.D. Mnangagwa. Though
publicly extolled, the former President’s advanced age and the increasing role
of his wife were shown to be ZANU PF’s version of the emperor’s new clothes;
embarrassing realities which could only be confronted in a context in which
there was no fear of an opposition take over.
Former President Robert Mugabe and Former First Lady Grace Mugabe |
A
weakened opposition did not cause the ouster of Mugabe, but it certainly aided
it. As the adage goes: correlation does not mean causation – but does not mean
there is no correlation. A stronger
opposition would have been the subject of ZANU PF’s hostility, raw aggression
and vitriol. It would have had a bigger say in the entire scheme to remove
Mugabe, more so if its political representation granted it the capacity to veto
it, and its external reach enabled it to mobilize regional support against it. More importantly,
it would have given credence to accusations from Mugabe that any attempts to
oust him were inspired by neo-colonial elements attempting to hand power to the
British; an argument which became moot once ZANU PF became so dominant that it
could effect a reset without the opposition’s involvement. This strongly
suggests that Robert Mugabe’s own claim to legitimacy as the leader of ZANU PF
relied, post 2000, on the existence of a strong opposition which personified the
vaunted danger he claimed to be guarding against. Without such a vibrant
opposition, the necessary miscalculation of targeting then Vice President E.D.
Mnangagwa and his military allies allowed for a consensus which would have been
well-nigh impossible to muster during a period of opposition vibrancy. This
harkens to the 2008 MDC slogan of “Morgan is more,” as it turns out, less is
more.
Absolutely: it's easier to understand the world looking backwards than forwards. The MDC was probably a factor affecting but not a reason leading to the old man's demise.
ReplyDeleteOf course with hindsight we have greater tools for historical analysis but a clear understanding of the past also aids in understanding and analysis of the future.
ReplyDeletePowerful submissions from using history to unpack the demise of Robert Mugabe.
ReplyDelete