OLD PRESCRIPTIONS TO NEW PROBLEMS: THE MDC’s RELOAD DOCUMENT

On 11 July 2019, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) launched its Roadmap to Economic Recovery, Openness, Legitimacy and Democracy (RELOAD) document. To address the multi-faced crises in Zimbabwe, the MDC proposes the establishment of a National Transitional Mechanism (NTM) to implement a comprehensive reform agenda. The structure and composition of the NTM is to be negotiated in a broad and inclusive process which will, among other issues, resolve who won the 31 July 2018 elections. The NTM is limited to a period of two years which will be concluded by the holding of free and fair elections. This entire process is to be undertaken following sustained advocacy, pressure and mobilization led by the MDC.

The notion of a transitional mechanism as the panacea to Zimbabwe’s crises is quite familiar. It approximates to the experience of the inclusive government and replicates calls by an organization called the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC) for a National Transitional Authority (NTA). In fact, many substantive aspects of RELOAD (including choice of diction) mirror the writings of the PCC. The justification for a transitional arrangement is the need to account for weak governance structures on the one hand and an illegitimate and/or incompetent incumbency on the other. This is addressed by incorporating persons who enjoy such legitimacy and have the requisite competence to overhaul the governance framework. The mechanism is temporary so that it can be responsive to the unique challenges necessitating its creation without supplanting the primacy of elections as the ultimate source of popular legitimacy.

This model of crisis management raises several questions. It is worth noting that many, particularly those in urban centers, believe that the MDC has the midas touch required to save the Zimbabwean economy from terminal decline. Even more people would grant the MDC incumbency, albeit in a transitional capacity, if only to improve their standard of living. This belief is inspired in no small part by the economic prosperity experienced during the inclusive government. However, the political conditions in Zimbabwe are radically different from those in 2008. The opposition does not have a combined majority in parliament. SADC has not initiated a mediation process and the election result was accepted by regional and international partners. There is very little leverage to force ZANU PF to the negotiating table. This necessarily heightens the level and intensity of advocacy, pressure and mobilization required to secure the desired negotiation process.

Legitimacy is a tenuous subject. In the RELOAD document, the MDC argues that every election in Zimbabwe since 1980 has been disputed, by which logic Zimbabwe has always had a legitimacy problem. And yet it was only after 2000 that the economy took a dramatic down turn. This strongly suggests the absence of any causal link between political legitimacy and economic performance, making it more a case of correlation without causation. Further, consider what is arguably the lowest point of constitutional legitimacy in Zimbabwe: the military coup of November 2017. The economic did not take a sharp nose dive and neither did the MDC call out the military intervention to remove Robert Mugabe from power. In many ways, they supported it. The RELOAD document continues MDC reticence on the subject, refusing to call it a coup and only referencing the events of November 2017. The MDC maintains a far more assertive stance against the 2018 election result than the 2017 military coup. This doublespeak undermines the credibility of the MDC’s vaunted concerns for political legitimacy.  

There are even more profound questions regarding the efficacy of ever-recurring extra-legal solutions to enduring governance inadequacies. A transitional arrangement was presented as the panacea to the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008. It was called for by the late Morgan Tsvangirai following his electoral defeat in 2013 and has been rehashed following the electoral result in 2018. It has become so repetitive that it is now an indispensable component of the opposition's mantra. Yet Zimbabwe was part of a national dialogue under the aegis of the inclusive government through the COPAC led constitution-making process. ZANU PF and MDC led a national conversation for creation of strong national institutions through which such dialogue could be sustained after constitutional enactment and between elections. Those institutions include the courts, parliament and various independent institutions supporting democracy – all endorsed overwhelmingly by a constitutional referendum.  Faced with electoral defeat, the MDC now recommends more national dialogue and further changes to the constitutional order. Even though the Constitutional Court confirmed the winner of the 2018 election, RELOAD leaves this question open for negotiation. Judgements of the highest court are made subject to extra-legal political gamesmanship. This is the antithesis of constitutionalism. Constitutional moments are not painstakingly created so they can be revised in accordance with the vicissitudes of electoral outcomes. 

The coalition arrangements in Kenya and Zimbabwe were rightly condemned as unholy alliances of political elites subverting democratic will. Some argued that, with the economy on the brink, the MDC actually gave ZANU PF a lifeline and extended Robert Mugabe’s tenure by joining the inclusive government. The opposition’s new found fondness for transitional arrangements may not only have the same effect for ZANU PF under Mnangagwa, but set a dangerous and self-defeating precedent. Consider the implications if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced that the MDC had won any future presidential election. It would only take replication of the MDC’s model of building resentment in its base whilst engaging in grievance-mongering for ZANU PF to undermine the election result and demand a transitional arrangement of their own. This is a common practice globally, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) notes as follows:

In some jurisdictions, pre- and post-election allegations of fraud or other irregularities are common, often with little or no supporting evidence. Sometimes these claims are a way of undermining the legitimacy of the winners of the election. In other cases, candidates use allegations of fraud or other wrongdoing as a way of saving face following an election defeat or to facilitate a negotiated outcome.

This has happened in Zimbabwe before. As it became clear that the opposition had defeated ZANU PF in 2008, members of ZEC and the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) were  arrested as a vote recount process began. ZANU PF also filed several election petitions challenging the election results. If the MDC continues to chip away at the public standing of national institutions it participated in creating, they will be left with very little room to manoeuver when ZANU PF regurgitates those talking points to deny them an election victory. Holding a nation hostage to grievances held by the electoral loser will prove counter-productive once that loser is ZANU PF, a party which has shown that it can orchestrate a real crisis in the face of electoral loss without hesitation.

Assuming that the NTM is appointed and works diligently to enact reforms within two years, what would this mean if it led to another ZANU PF victory as occurred after the inclusive government? It would mean even more calls for national dialogue in an endless cycle of grievance-mongering with the object of power capture. According to MDC leader Nelson Chamisa, the pressure to secure national dialogue shall be instigated by ordinary party members and supporters since they are the signal. A few moments later, he reminded the same people that strategy cannot be democratized and so must be left to leadership, their strategic unit. This left many wondering whether the campaign for dialogue shall be initiated bottom-up by the signal or top down by the strategic unit. RELOAD is riddled with the same prevarication, with many bold assertions which are thin on substance. With new challenges including lack of trust in the banking system, record low power generation and the reluctance of regional partners to assist, the solution proffered is decidedly backward looking. In a most circuitous way, RELOAD proposes a solution to the 2019 crises through a political reset to the institutional arrangements of 2009; distinctly old prescriptions to dynamic and ever-changing problems.